Intrinsic Value Per Share IVPS
Full transcript 10,522 words

Machine transcribed and corrected for names and figures. It is the same text as the subtitle track on the video, so the page cannot say something the recording does not.

0:00 Welcome, and what this is

Hi, everyone. Thank you for joining. It's eight o'clock here in Dubai, and we already have 20 participants, which I think is a great start for the first event and hopefully the first of many. I think I'll get going and I think more people will join us as we go throughout. I want to make sure that we're respectful of everyone's time. The objective today is to spend about an hour and talk about Berkshire. I have a set of slides and the website that I prepared. And what I'd like to do is maybe talk for about a half an hour on the slides, which covered a high level of the content of the website. And then we'll do a half an hour, hopefully, of live Q&A. And as Warren has said many times, bring the fastballs, not the softballs. So whatever is on your mind about Berkshire, we're related to the website. And I'd like to keep it probably just to the Berkshire stock as opposed to other broader stocks and to answer your questions and make this time valuable. So the 25 people that we have so far span all the way, I believe, from Japan to Chicago, Dubai, Lisbon, all the way to California. So we have just about every time zone on a Friday. So I really appreciate you guys joining. Let me tell you my objectives. And let me also tell you that I've gotten several requests that the recording of this video be shared. So I do intend to put the recording probably unedited on YouTube and then that'll be linked on the website. So thank you all for joining and let's get started. So my objectives for today are really to have fun, learn something new, and then get feedback and inspiration from you guys. So in order to do that, rather than go into a deep dive of all the numbers on the website, what I thought I would do is talk about why I put together intrinsic value per share.com, what kind of contents there, and then jump right into Berkshire and talk about the price versus what is it worth. And then talk about the methodology of how do I arrive at that calculation and talk about a summary of kind of the key drivers behind the business that are all explained in far more detail on the website. And then from there, we'll hopefully have about a half an hour left and we'll do Q&A. And if the Q&A is lively, I'll stick around for anyone that doesn't get their question answered. So I'll add more time. So on intrinsicvaluepershare.com, I wanted to highlight that

2:43 Why I built intrinsicvaluepershare.com

what this website is, is really bringing together three things that I find very fascinating and that are intersecting. So I am a professional investor. I've spent the last seven years managing an institutional portfolio here from Dubai. And in investing, where that led me was to Warren Buffett and his shareholder letters, his partner, Charlie Munger, and of course, eventually to Omaha, where a lot of the people that are attending today, that I was able to meet you guys and share this interest. But most importantly, I think what's changed is technology and AI has made it so much more accessible and really enable you to create content. And so what had happened is I've been following Berkshire and I've been invested in Berkshire for more than 13 years now, but I've been calculating intrinsic value by hand in spreadsheets that exist on my laptop. And with AI, it finally reached a point where I was able to take that content and I'm able to create a website without writing any code. And I'm able to work with the AI to really do a deep dive and really answer the questions that I have that I want to know about an owner of this business. And it's really enabled me to go much further than just reading the filings. And so it's enabled that design and creation. And it really improves the depth and the content. So the AI enabled me to share this work that I've been preparing and monitoring for really the last 13 years, but put online for the first time back in March, and then substantially revised with the latest generation of AI last month. So that's the intersection. Let's move to Berkshire itself.

I bet a lot of people wish we would have had this webinar about a month ago because Berkshire had really been flat for the entire year while AI and the S&P have been doing quite well. And everything seems to have changed around October 1st. So Berkshire as of yesterday is up 17% for the year, which is well ahead of the S&P. And we're looking at the current share price above 590 is substantially above the previous high of 540, which we had achieved back in May of 2025, which was the weekend before Warren announced that he was stepping down as CEO and Greg Abel was going to take over. So that transition has been ongoing. It was announced 18 months ago, and Greg has been CEO and very active so far through this year. And as the market has started to reward some of the value sensitive stocks,

Berkshire has performed very well. And I'll talk about how that's changed my perception. And it does not change the calculation of intrinsic value, but it does change my decision of how I'm thinking about is it a good time to buy Berkshire or how should I think about that? What I want to highlight is that Berkshire, despite having very little direct technology exposure, which has been the main driver of the S&P for the last 15 years, has more or less managed to perform using its traditional value

5:50 Berkshire versus the S&P 500

businesses as well as the S&P. So on this table, you can see for the last 15 years, Berkshire is compounded at 14.5%, which is just modestly below what we saw for the S&P 500. And if you go all the way back to 1999, so the turn of the century, which is where I really like to benchmark Berkshire to, and I'll explain the reason, you can see that Berkshire share price has gone up 10.9% compounded, which doesn't sound substantial until you compound it for 26 and a half years. And the price of Berkshire stock has gone up almost 15x in the last 26 years. So that's really the power of owning a business that's able to compound its value at double digits over a long period of time, which I believe Berkshire can continue to do.

If you were to compound the S&P 500, which is the 8.3%, in fact, the S&P since the turn of the century is up about eight and a half times, which is a fantastic return. But with Berkshire reaching almost 15 times, you've nearly doubled the value of your investment by owning Berkshire instead of the S&P for the last 26 years. I want you to keep in mind this 10.9%, that's the compounded annual rate of return. The reason that Berkshire has achieved that 10.9% compounded price return is really because of the fact that it's been able to increase its intrinsic, its book value at 10.5% per year. So over a very long period of time, if you're the owner of a company, whether you buy it at a discount, even a large discount, or even if you pay more than the intrinsic value, what you end up getting over that long period of time is the increase in value, which you can think of as the increase in profits or the net profit of the company. So for that 26 year period, Berkshire has increased its book value per share at 10.5% compounded, which aligns very, very closely with the share price that we've seen. So Berkshire is not creating value by having an expansion in its multiple, it's actually earning the increase in value in the share price through the increase in the value of its actual businesses that it owns. So my key belief is is that Berkshire is poised to continue to compound its growth around this 10% level. And I'll talk about why I believe that's to be the case. But this 10.5% compounding is my expected rate of return

8:32 Price versus intrinsic value: the base case

when I purchase Berkshire at its intrinsic value. And the intrinsic value to give a single number, I peg around $524. So this is using the latest balance sheet as of the third quarter. And I'll talk about the key drivers of how I get this value in this range between kind of 10% upside downside, which is the conservatism that I bake into my estimate. I've been calculating an estimate using almost the same methodology for almost 10 years. And for a majority of the time Berkshire share price has been below my estimate of intrinsic value. It's actually very recent that we've seen this strong growth in share price. And the challenge we have now and the question I get most often is now that Berkshire is trading at $590 per B share, and the intrinsic value is $524 per B share, that we're trading now almost 13% above my estimate of intrinsic value. So is Berkshire still worth holding on to if you already own it? Or is it worth purchasing if you don't own it? What I'd like to do is just relate

this back to the increase in value of Berkshire itself. So if Berkshire is able to continue to grow its value at about 10% per year, and that would be your return on your investment if you paid the intrinsic value, assuming my intrinsic value is correct, then you'd get around 10%. So if you were to pay about 10% more than intrinsic value, so you're to buy a share today at $590, you're paying 10% more than the intrinsic value. And if you're to hold on to that share, let's say for the next 10 years,

what I would expect is you basically have a 1% per year headwind against the 10% increase in business value. So purchasing Berkshire at a premium does not necessarily make it a bad investment, it simply reduces your expected rate of return. And so one of the ways that I think about it is I consistently update the intrinsic value, the intrinsic value does not change at a substantial rate most of the time for Berkshire. However, the market price changes all the time. So earlier this year, when I first published the website back in March, my intrinsic value estimate at that time was $495, and the share price was $505. So what that illustrates is that the share price is far more volatile than the intrinsic value. But also, the intrinsic value, especially in the case of Berkshire, continues to appreciate at a pretty rhythmic rate that comes out to between 2% or 3% per quarter and comes out to about 10% per year. So that's not what I would expect the value of the shares in our account to show every year. But over time, I showed you how the share price over long periods of time continues to mirror the increase in value.

11:31 Where book value sits, and why it understates

The other thing I wanted to highlight on this chart is all the way on the far left is the book value. Now, the book value comes straight off the balance sheet of Berkshire. And it's simply the accounting identity, which is assets minus liabilities equals equity. So this is Berkshire's equity of about $770 billion divided by the number of shares. And wouldn't we all like to buy Berkshire at its book value? That's really only happened twice in the last 26 years. And the first time was right around the financial crisis. And the second time was during COVID. So it's a highly unusual scenario where I would expect the price of Berkshire to fall towards its book value. What I've generally seen is that Berkshire tends to trade around its intrinsic value, or what I think the intrinsic value. And for a majority of the last 10 years, it's actually traded at a discount to the intrinsic value. So I would say, and I'll show you some further charts, that we're in a bit of a stretch valuation. However, as Berkshire continues to increase its value, it tends to catch up.

Now, let me talk more about the 524. Because although it's an estimate, that's my grounding, that's my foundation of how do I think about the price of Berkshire and what I should pay if I plan to buy or sell the shares. The 524 is quite unique for Berkshire because a majority of the balance

13:00 Reading the balance sheet: what is marked to market

sheet is mark to market, and it has a very clear value. Now, what you almost always see in the headlines is Berkshire's $350 billion of cash. So that works out to about $166 a share. And $1 of cash for most people is worth $1. In addition, Berkshire now has about $336 billion of equity, some fixed income, and it owes a little bit of capital gains tax, which we all know if you sell a stock in the United States and you've made a gain, you owe tax. So I like to subtract the tax

because that would be the recoverable value. And so what you end up with is another $155 of Berkshire's share price, which really is quite liquid. And every day we know the price of Apple, Coca-Cola and their other holdings. So about 60% of Berkshire's balance sheet and Berkshire's value is liquid securities. The trick to calculating the intrinsic value, and it's really the reason why the intrinsic value of 524 is different than the book value of 358. The difference here that I'm coming up with, and the intrinsic value I calculate is about one and a half times book value, all of that is coming from Berkshire's operating businesses. So I think most of you are quite familiar with Berkshire, but it owns more than 70 major businesses, the largest of which are insurance. And other large businesses include the BNSF Railway,

14:32 Berkshire Hathaway Energy and the operating businesses

Berkshire Hathaway Energy, which is one of the largest energy companies, utilities in the United States, and a very large and diverse set of manufacturing service and retail businesses, which cover everything from aircraft part manufacturing to running shoes, to a car dealership, home agency, building products, really a diversified slice of the American economy, ex-technology. And I'll talk about why essentially what happens is when Berkshire buys a new business, the accounting value of that business goes on the balance sheet and is included in the book value. But over time, as that business is run well and becomes more valuable, the value of that business becomes far more than what's on the balance sheet. And that's why book value no longer remains really the best measure of kind of assessing what should I pay for Berkshire. Some of the biggest drivers of the difference between the book value and what I think the intrinsic value would really be the BNSF Railway, which has more than tripled the profits since it was purchased in 2009. Berkshire Hathaway Energy continues to reinvest and grow. And some of the manufacturing businesses like Precision Cast Parts, which originally looked like a poor acquisition that was written down in 2016, is now worth probably three to four times the $35 billion that he paid for it. So to understand Berkshire, I think it's quite easy to understand the cash.

16:00 The equity portfolio

It's quite easy to understand the equities. And this is where most of the financial media focuses. But really, to make a good estimate and to really decide, am I making a good acquisition when I buy Berkshire shares, you really have to spend a fair amount of time looking at the operating businesses. And I believe Greg was selected as CEO because he's doing a better job than Warren ever did in extracting and driving the profitability of these businesses. So I would expect this share, which is harder to value to become a more important piece of Berkshire over time.

I don't want to get too far into the details because that would be a deep dive, but I wanted to show a chart where I'm breaking out those three categories. And of course, we have cash, we have investments, and then we have the operating businesses. I wanted to highlight, when I come up with 524, I'm not trying to be conservative, I'm trying to be right. Now, intrinsic value is a fuzzy concept. There's no course you're going to take in your MBA that tells you how to calculate it. Warren always talks about that. And so you have to use estimates. I tend to be more conservative. So with the share price being above my intrinsic value, unless it gets so far away that I think that some of my assumptions are no longer valid, I tend to think that the 524, although I call it the base case, for me is really the downside case.

And one of the reasons that I'm very, very conservative is in valuing the insurance underwriting.

17:33 Insurance, and the float

So Berkshire controls about half of all the insurance, property and casualty capital in the entire world. They write several kinds of property and casualty, but the biggest would be Geico auto insurance in the United States. And the insurance over the last three years has generated nearly $20 billion of profit. Now, I look back over the last 30 years, and I say insurance is volatile, especially things like hurricane risk in Florida. And I come up with an average insurance profit of $2 billion from underwriting. And I put a 10x multiple on this, which I think is not very demanding. So I'm valuing their insurance business, which is the core of Berkshire, excluding the assets owned by insurance, at only $20 billion, which is only a couple of dollars a share. That's inherently very conservative. And I put more realistic valuations on some of the other big businesses, including BNSF. I think they're going to make about $6 billion this year. And I put a PE multiple closer to 20.

I benchmarked that against their competitor, which is Union Pacific, which actually trades closer to a 25 multiple. So across the board, when I put this numbers, these set of numbers together, I think generally they're quite conservative and they've been pretty accurate. Now, the other thing I do is I'm using normalized profit. Normalized profit of $58 billion is not a number you're going to find anywhere in Berkshire's financial statements, because what I'm trying to do is estimate the value of all the businesses they own, including the fact that some years some businesses are up, others are down. I'm trying to take a longer term view of what I call, using Warren's term, normalized profit. So BNSF Railway normalized profit of six. Last year, they actually made five and a half. So Greg has come out and they're doing a lot of work to make the railroad more profitable. And I think over time, they'll not only make $6 billion a year, but far more. So I'm using adjusted numbers that do not match the financials. So you have to take this entire page as a set of estimates. And the only things that are really going to match when you look at the balance sheet will be the cash and the public equities fixed income. The estimated value of the other segments are based on my estimates. And what I do is I add up the total value of Berkshire as an entity and I end up with $1.1 trillion.

And by dividing by the number of shares is $524 a share and using my estimated earnings, which includes all of the proportional earnings of the public equities that Berkshire owns. Although those earnings will never show up in the income statement, I'm including them. I essentially think Berkshire makes about $60 billion a year. And to get that $60 billion a year, essentially, at intrinsic value, I'd say we're willing to pay $1.1 trillion for that, which is a PE of about 19.

So again, I've said that Berkshire's share price is appreciated. I think the look-through estimated PE of Berkshire is close to 19 or 20. And the market, although they've given us different adjusted numbers, is currently trading around 26 times. So Berkshire, even at its current price of $590, on a PE basis, which is not, I think, the best way to look at it, is trading at 21.5 times or less than the S&P 500. So not only do I think it's a more conservatively run business that's more diversified than the average company in the S&P or the entire group of S&P, but it actually continues to trade at a discount, even though it's above the intrinsic value.

21:13 Walking the website: the valuation line by line

What I want to do from there, before we do get to Q&A, I just wanted to show a couple of pages on the website, because while I'm giving a summary, I've used AI to draft really an entire narrative at a much deeper level than I've just walked through. And I'll give a couple of examples. So the intrinsic value, I peg around one and a half times book value, and at $590 a share, Berkshire is actually now trading about 1.65 times book value. So we can look at Berkshire, how it's performing and how it's valued relative to its history.

And so if you go back to 2000, you can see in the early 2000s, really all the way until the financial crisis, financials and insurance companies were far more popular with investors and traded at much higher multiples. So we have seen Berkshire, in fact, twice trade above two times book value, which I think is quite rich. But from the financial crisis all the way until shortly after COVID, Berkshire traded between 1.2 and 1.3 times book value. And only very recently, with the 17% share price rise in the last month, has Berkshire really trended to this higher end of the range of 1.6 times. Is this the new normal? Will Berkshire continue to appreciate? I don't have a crystal ball, but I'm less inclined to be a buyer at a higher price. As a true value investor, I want to buy at or below intrinsic value. And again, coming back to that assumption, if you pay the intrinsic value, I think you'd get around that 10% rate of return over time. And if you pay a premium, let's say today's price and you buy Berkshire shares, I simply think that you would have to accept a lower expected return. So maybe you would expect to earn about 8% compounded for the next number of years, as opposed to the 10% you would expect if you paid intrinsic value. And I've explained all this in the website. I've showed quite a bit of history. All of the numbers are coming really from Capital IQ or numbers that I've taken from their financials. So although all the text is written by AI, I'm not too worried about any hallucination in the data that you'll see on the website. And I'm currently on the book value tab. On the book value tab, I wanted to highlight something about the long-term history of Berkshire and something that I often see people confused when they're commenting online. So Berkshire has compounded at just below 20% per year for the last 60 years. So the price of Berkshire since Warren Buffett took over, I think in 1965, has gone up 6.1 million percent.

Now, if you look at this chart and you look at the axis, you can see from the 1960s all the way until about 1998, Berkshire was averaging about 25% per year increase in book value per share, which is that 10.5 measure I was talking about. And you can see that there was a step change in 1998 of Berkshire growing at a much lower rate. Now, Warren had always warned that there would be a lower rate of return as the company got bigger, but there was also a substantial change in the composition of the company. So, for example, in the 1990s, as the price of Coca-Cola appreciated so quickly, it was driving a very fast levered return.

In 1998, Berkshire decided to take over General Re, and it changed the nature of its business to be more of a reinsurance and less of an investment company. In 1996, it also took over Geico. So it became an operating business. In 1999, they took over the utility. In 2009, they bought the railroad. And they made a very, very large number of operating company acquisitions all throughout the 2000s. And what you end up seeing is that the book value per share compounded at 10.5% for the last 26 years. And I think that is the correct measure of thinking about the continued sustainable rate of growth of Berkshire at its current size. Now, could they go faster? Yes, but we just haven't seen the opportunities, which for Berkshire really means acquiring other companies, that they would need to generate faster earnings growth than they've been able to do so far.

So I'd really encourage you to spend some time on whichever topic you find interesting about Berkshire. I've tried to cover the entire waterfront on the website, including things like deep dive into, let's say, Geico, comparing it to its largest competitor, Progressive, which Warren and Ajit have talked about are really outperforming Berkshire, Geico's performance for the last couple of years. So I tried to do a deep dive on why that is. And then a few other areas that I think you might find interesting is, for example, if you're interested in the railroad, which I peg is worth more than $120 billion, there's details on the scope of the railroad, how it compares to its competitor, the dividends it's paying to Berkshire, and quite a bit of additional information to really just better understand the business itself.

And then the last thing that I would highlight, and in fact, it was the reason that I made the website myself to explore, is to look at this idea of capital allocation. So Berkshire is a conglomerate. And although it's an insurance company, everyone looks at it for different reasons for holding the cash or holding the stocks. Some people call it a mutual fund. Some people like me focus on the railroad or the utility. And what it's really doing is taking those earnings, that $58 billion a year of cash that's coming in, and it is making a decision, previously Warren and now Greg, on what can it do with those $60 billion a year that it's coming in? How can it deploy that money to continue to grow at 10% or faster per year? Because if they weren't able to, Berkshire would basically become a bond and really pay that cash back out to us, the shareholders. And as we know, it's been 60 years with no dividend, and there's none in sight. So why do they do that? The reason is because Warren and Greg believe that they can keep that $60 billion a year, reinvest in new businesses, or grow their existing businesses, and continue to grow all of the money they return at that 10% rate. And with $770 billion of equity on the balance sheet, they need, in order to grow that, I mean, they need to deliver almost $70 billion a year of equity earnings. Are they able to do that? Well, I would argue so far, the answer remains yes. And although I only have 2025, I put a blog post out to say, essentially, I think Greg's doing a very good job of taking that money that's coming into Berkshire and redeploying the capital in order to make investments that will allow Berkshire to continue to grow at that 10% rate.

So looking at the financial statement that came out last Saturday, year to date, Berkshire has brought in $34 billion of cash. And with that, they've made two acquisitions for $16 billion, which was OxyChem and the home builder. They've reinvested $16 billion into their existing businesses, which is primarily at the railroad and the utility. And then they bought back almost $14 billion of stock. Now, the last thing I'll talk about is the stock buyback.

The stock buyback is very interesting because in the financial statements, they say they'll only buy back stock below intrinsic value. So that allows me to kind of validate the intrinsic value that I'm calculating. And what we saw was that the price that they were willing to buy back stock, and I believe they bought back almost $10 billion of stock in the last 90 days, they paid up to $503 a share. So if Warren and Greg are willing to buy their own stock around $500, and they'll only buy below intrinsic value, then that kind of helped me narrow in to say that that $525 estimate or $524 is probably pretty close and using this methodology pretty close to how they're thinking about it.

But unfortunately, as the share price gets higher and the premium gets higher, I think that they'll be buying less stock. So it makes the job again harder for Greg because he'll have to find other opportunities to deploy the cash. Everyone's always watching and waiting to see what stock they buy. And they've been buying quite a lot of Google, which I think it probably makes sense for them. But I don't think and I wouldn't expect that Berkshire will spend most of its cash buying stocks going forward. I think what we've seen with Greg is he'll be making significant acquisitions. And those acquisitions, I think, will add a lot of value for us as shareholders because all of that $350 billion of cash is currently only making 4% before tax. So to have one-third of the balance sheet invested at 4% is not helping us. It's a drag of achieving that 10% compounded return we're looking for.

So what I would think is if they're able to buy attractively priced businesses, instead of earning 4% on, let's say, $10 billion, when he buys OxyChem for $10 billion, I would expect that he's earning closer to 10% return or $1 billion a year, which is substantially higher than what they're making today on the cash. And that's really the key driver in that upside intrinsic value that I put together. So $5.24 is what I think it's worth now. And the upside is me anticipating that they continue to make good acquisitions. So I'm not a buyer today at $5.90. I think the reason is because I've been quite spoiled that for so many years I've been able to continue to acquire or recommend Berkshire shares below the intrinsic value, which gave me confidence to tell people that I think you'll get a 10% rate of return. But now that we're a bit stretched, and I don't think we're overvalued, but we're fully valued at really 1.65 or 13% above intrinsic value. I think we're looking at, if we purchase today, probably a 7% or 8% return, which I think is a great return overall. I think it'll look pretty favorable compared to the market as well. But as a value investor, you know, this idea of margin of safety, I don't see as much margin of safety anymore, although I do feel confident that we generate a strong return.

32:07 Questions

So I think I'll stop there. I've gone over, as always, but I'd like to turn it to questions. And the way I'd like to do that is either, I guess, raise your hand or indicate in the chat, and then I'll try to unmute you so that you can ask the question and we can interact a bit. And if nobody asks a question, I have a list of questions myself, but I'd rather hear from you guys. Hey, Andrew.

32:44 The biggest risks, and what creates the downside case

Hi, Nitin. Go ahead, please. I was wondering what you think the biggest risks are and what kind of creates that downside scenario you have, or whether there's even a worse downside scenario. Great question. I would say two primary risks. The first is really on the insurance side. When I calculate this, I subtract $30 billion from the cash to say that is the amount that Berkshire could lose if there's a substantial hurricane or other incident that they've insured and will have to pay out very quickly. So although we're all always counting on that $350 billion of cash, I think that there is a significant amount of risk in the insurance business where the losses could really be substantial.

And I would say the other risk that I see is just generally Berkshire is now trading at a premium and they own $330 billion of stock. So at any given time, I always assume that the stock market in general could decline 30%. And so 30% of $330 billion is $110 billion reduction, which is more than 10% of the value of Berkshire, just from the stock market holdings. And I think that there's kind of an overreaction when that happens, because Berkshire is not selling Moody's or Coca-Cola or probably Google if the stock price goes down 30%. They're probably actually buying more, but as people see the decline in the stock, they take a look at this kind of measure or they read an article and they see that the value of Berkshire is declining because its stock prices are declining. Then that probably also causes a larger reaction in the price of the stock.

So I would highlight those as the two areas that probably I think about the most and I think could cause really large losses that would impact investor confidence and that could really drive a significant swing in the share price. Shivam? Hey. Hey, Andrew. Excellent, excellent, excellent presentation, first and foremost, very informative, very good breakdown on all of the underlying subsidiaries as well.

35:07 Look-through earnings across the subsidiaries

The question I had for you was, when you account for all of the underlying holdings, the public companies and also the subsidiaries that Berkshire owns, which, conservatively speaking, just based on taking your intrinsic value into factor as well, where do you think they will exceed earnings expectations at? If you had to pick one segment, where would you see that? I'll give two answers. The first is an insurance relative to my intrinsic value. I think I highlighted that Berkshire has made more than $20 billion insurance profit in the last three years. I'm counting on $2 billion a year. Year to date, they've already made $6 billion of insurance profit. So, I don't think they get anywhere near enough credit for the quality of their insurance businesses and the profit that that generates over time, including the float. And I'm going to go to a slide and maybe it's helpful.

I can't see the far right. Give me a second. These negative bars, maybe there's a better way to show it. If you look at this chart on insurance, you can see that the last three years that they've achieved truly exceptional levels of profitability. A big part of that was Ajit Jain being able to write in Florida when no one else was really willing to take on the risk. And there weren't really any major hurricanes, so it was pure profit. And so, I think Berkshire is set up to continue to outperform in insurance and really generate far more profit than they've historically been able to generate. So, I'm using the assumption that they're making $2 billion a year, which really takes into account 1999 through, let's call it 2022.

And what we've seen in the last three years and even this year is that they're generating exceptional profit in the insurance industry. And I see no end in sight for that. A second place I would highlight that I really don't see anyone talking about is Berkshire has a substantial number of housing-related companies. I think everyone in the United States knows with mortgage rates above 7%, houses are not being built, they're not being sold, they're not being renovated. Berkshire has everything from real estate agencies to building products to home builders. I think that there's probably a ballpark number between $2 and $5 billion of additional annual earnings that Berkshire will earn when mortgage rates come down and the housing market picks up. Do I know when that's going to happen? No. But when I calculate Berkshire earning about $58, call it $60 billion a year of profit, to add another $5 billion on top of that from the businesses they already own is a really meaningful driver. So I think Greg's job is to squeeze all of the 70 businesses they have to really drive a higher level of profitability than they've achieved. But a factor outside his control that to me seems inevitable, it's just a matter of time before the mortgage rates come to a more reasonable level and the U.S. housing market picks up. And I think at that point, Berkshire's profitability from all of its housing-related businesses will be really spectacular.

So those would be the two areas. So I'd highlight building products or just home building in general and then insurance.

38:50 What Greg Abel might simplify, sell or regroup

I'm going to call on Luke next. Thank you for raising your hand. Thank you for the question, Shivu. Awesome presentation. I think it's great to get so much detail broken down so carefully. Often you're scribbling notes in the class and kind of hanging on every word while we're also listening to the course. But yeah, one question I have for you. What's your view? Which businesses do you think are candidates for Greg to simplify or sell or change direction on that he might not have done in the first few months after taking over because of like out of respect for Warren? So maybe companies that Warren was loyal to for different reasons that Greg doesn't need to worry about.

That's a good question. I don't see him really selling much. I can give an example of a couple of companies that I do think Greg was caused to be sold. Like I think they sold Kirby Vacuum Cleaner, which is something that they got from Scott Fetzer back in 1986. So I have seen examples of him over the last six or seven years kind of cleaning up and selling businesses. We also saw Ted Weschler sell a lot of the legacy newspaper businesses a couple of years ago. But I think the hint, at least my best guess to answer your question, is what he talked about at this year's annual meeting is Greg is starting to create kind of groups of companies rather than letting each one run on its own. So he's creating now like a home building group where Clayton Holmes will be joined with Taylor Morrison and run as a kind of integrated home builder, which will give them synergy. He talked about a metals group, which I think would be precision cast parts, IMC, which makes cutting tools and a whole host of kind of metal related businesses. And I think what he'll do is he'll start to group them into mini conglomerates inside of Berkshire. And then he'll probably elevate people to not only run, let's say, NetJets, but the gentleman who's running all of the retail businesses. And so he'll just put kind of higher level of accountability for these subsidiaries to work together to kind of drive more synergy, whether that's how they're buying insurance or how they're doing marketing or to really kind of get the logical groups working together and acting as a bigger business rather than, let's say, three or four independent businesses that just happen to be owned by Berkshire.

So I think he'll create a chemicals group, he'll create a home building group, he'll probably create a building product group. And I think Berkshire probably owns 10 building product groups like or not groups, but companies, including bricks, insulation, floorboards. I mean, I think he'll take all of that and he'll put an executive in charge and say, run it as if you're a publicly traded building company. And so I think it's very unlikely that he'd sell anything, or at least I don't have anything in mind.

The last thing I'd highlight is if you look at the utilities, because of the wildfire risk, they really underinvested on the West Coast and they stopped buying utilities, which really slowed down the growth of the Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company. And what I've seen them do is really starting to exit California and Oregon, which were part of Pacific Corp and really has cost them between three and five billion dollars of wildfire liabilities because of the fires and the deaths. And I think what that does is show that Greg has the same mindset of Warren, which is even though we have a profitable utility that probably has a 10% guaranteed rate of return forever, I will exit the business if it will hurt my reputation or cause me to lose substantial money if regulation or something else changes in the future. So I would actually be most interested and excited if the reason that they exit businesses is they're willing to give a profit and really sell things at a modest price like they did with Oregon Utility to reduce risk over time. Because one of the reasons I'm most excited about Berkshire is not the synergy or the unknown profit or what's to come, but really the fact that it's run so conservatively that all of the numbers that I see in the annual report and whenever I dig into their subsidiaries, the way that they're running the business is not to maximize profit or earnings, but to run the business so that it generates more profits for the next five or 10 years. Or next, in the case of the railroad, the next hundred years, so I view this diversified group under Berkshire as a very good slice of the entire American economy, excluding technology, and one that's very, it's well run, but it's conservatively run. And I think, at least the personality that I got from Greg so far is, he's exactly that kind of guy that cares about what's the downside, what's the risk, I'll even sell a business, even though we say we won't, to reduce risk, and I'm not as concerned about the upside, because if I run my shop well, it will take care of itself.

So a long answer, but I tried to hit on a couple different aspects. Thank you. Thanks for the question, Luke. Max?

44:17 Berkshire and technology

Hey, Andrew. Excellent job. Thank you so much for this presentation. I realize that the recent Bending Spoons investment is, like, basically a rounding error for them, but I'm just kind of interested on your thoughts about it. And I guess, more generally, do you think that Berkshire could move into the sort of software space more? Thank you so much. Thanks for the tough question. Bending Spoons, for anyone that's not aware, is kind of a roll-up or a conglomerate where they're buying lots of older software companies, things like AOL or things like Meetup.com or Evernote. And what I've seen them do is they acquire these businesses, and then they quickly raise the price, which drives out a lot of the customers who like to use the free version, but charges a lot of money to the customers who are really interested in the product. I think that was a big surprise for two reasons. Number one, it was an IPO, and Warren has said so many times they don't do IPOs.

That's not always true because they did also the Snowflake IPO, if you remember, and they also did a Paytm IPO, which was a payments company in India. So we have seen them acting a little bit differently. I think the point that you made that it's a rounding error is true, but I do believe they've invested more than a billion dollars. So even for Greg, who's just taken over, I mean, every billion dollars probably counts, and he probably feels Warren's watching.

It was a bit of a head-scratcher. I really don't think that Berkshire is going to move aggressively into technology. Apple, I understand it more as a consumer product play, and it's been an exceptional business. I'll talk about Apple in a minute. And then the other one, recently we've seen them put $35 billion into Google. So you could argue Google's software, but I really see Google as a distribution company, an infrastructure company. And I think what I've always heard Warren tell, Ted Weschler, who's doing the investments, as well as Greg and everyone else, think big. Because Berkshire, if it's generating $60 billion a year, in the next 10 years, Berkshire has another $600 billion coming its way, on top of the $350 billion of cash it already has. So in the next 10 years, Greg and Ted and whoever joins them has to figure out an intelligent way to invest about a trillion dollars in the next 10 years. So doing it a billion dollars at a time is not going to work, because that's 0.1%. So it doesn't worry me. I've seen a lot of worry. I don't think that they're going to find large opportunities in software, because software, to me, and to everything I've learned about how Warren thinks, is just too unpredictable, especially with AI.

And on AI, you know, I made this entire website, which has something like 30,000 words, and probably 200 charts, and God knows what else. And I didn't even look at the HTML at any point of time. And everything I had to do as far as software and the team that it would have taken to make this website, I got for a $20 Cloud Code subscription. So I think software is fundamentally changing. And they must have some form of insight or confidence that the way that Bending Spoons is extracting value from those existing applications will continue. But that was quite out of character. That was quite unusual. I hope that's not the trend.

At the same time, I do hope that they focus more on technology, because the opportunity to work with Google on generating additional electricity for data centers or building data centers with Google or other aspects of Google's business, even though it's technology and software, I think will represent such a large portion of the economy and such a large opportunity to use that trillion dollars they're going to have. That I would rather see them make very large acquisitions in the more infrastructure-like technology than these kind of small software pieces.

I don't know if that's a complete answer to your question. So I'm not really sure what they're thinking. And I'd be happy to ask them next year at the annual meeting what the heck they were thinking so they can explain themselves. I wanted to touch on Apple because we're talking about software and equity investments. If I go to the chart on capital allocation, I wanted to highlight the fact that Berkshire has $352 billion of cash on its balance sheet. Not only is it highly unusual, but I don't see people talk about where did it come from.

And I would say up until 2022, Berkshire had around $150 billion of cash. And Warren and Charlie were talking at the meeting that, you know, if we were ever to hold that amount of cash, you know, we're really not doing our job because we need to find places to put it. And now, three years later, we see them with $350 billion. And where did that come from? Actually, a majority of that increase came from the sale of Apple. So I don't mind, in today's market, Berkshire holding that huge amount of cash earning 4% because it gives them the opportunity when something else comes along to make a great investment.

And I think it's quantified somewhere on the site that I won't be able to find now, but something like $150 billion of that cash was pure profit that they recognized by selling Apple. Now, I've also seen people complain because they were selling Apple around $200 a share. They bought it around $35 a share. So they made five or six times their money. But today we can all see that Apple's the most valuable company in the world and it's worth $350 a share, which is 75% more than where they sold it for. So they have the cash. They have that optionality. They made an exceptional investment in a technology company, which was out of character. But that investment paid off in spades.

And I think we see that every decade from Berkshire. So I wouldn't be surprised if they do that again. I don't know if Google is going to be the one, if Google is going to be the next Apple. But I think if they can buy it at the right price, it has a great chance. So that's kind of a fuller answer on Berkshire's investments in technology. Thanks, Max.

51:02 $100 to invest: cash, SpaceX bonds at 8%, or Berkshire?

Where's Surindra? I'm sure he has a difficult question. Hello? Hello? Hello? Ian. Hey, Surindra. Any questions? Hey. My question would be, you know, on if today you received, let's say, $100 to invest and you have three options. One, let's say, cash, once you have SpaceX bonds, which can yield eight or eight and a half percent or Berkshire, how will you distribute that $100? All right. That reminded me, I should have said up front that this is an educational webinar and it's not investment advice, in case any lawyer is listening.

On your question, here's how I would think about it. It's not so straightforward. And I think the reason why, for everyone following along, is cash today, which I think of as T-bills, you can make 4% pre-tax. SpaceX, I think SpaceX bonds are trading something like 8%. And I believe, correct me if I'm wrong, SpaceX is an investment grade rated bond, correct? Correct. And then Berkshire, I'm saying, if you buy close to its intrinsic value, we'll make 10%. But I'm saying we're more than 10% above the intrinsic value. So I'm saying that I would expect closer to an 8% rate of return.

So should I take risk-free cash and wait for something better at 4%? Should I buy a bond, which will pay me 8%, so double cash? Or should I buy Berkshire, which will make me 8%? I think the trade-off is then between Berkshire and SpaceX bonds, because they're both 8%. But the reality and the way that I think about this when I'm buying a stock, first of all, I have to account for the risk of the stock price going up or down all the time and causing me to lose sleep. But the 8% on Berkshire is not the same as 8% on SpaceX. And I'll ignore the tax implications. But the SpaceX is going to pay you an 8% coupon.

And so if you hold that bond for the next 10 years, you'll get 8, 8, 8, 8, 8. And you'll get 8 times 10. And so for every $100, you would get $180 in the end. Berkshire is not paying us any cash dividend whatsoever. And they're retaining that 8%. So what I would expect is that Berkshire compounds at 8%. And the difference between 8 times 10 and then 8% raised to the 10th power is substantial. And that compounded growth of 8% would basically more than double by year 8. And then I would end up with something like 230, 220, 230, as opposed to the 180 that I would get in the SpaceX bond.

And I would still own Berkshire. And I wouldn't have to find a new bond when the SpaceX matures. So I feel so confident in the future of Berkshire for the next 5 or 10 years that even at an 8% compounded return, I think will be more than adequate return on my $100. And I think it's very difficult to try and predict holding. It's one thing for Warren Buffett to do it. It's another thing for us to sit around with that cash at 4% and think we're going to find the next great investment.

Berkshire is probably the lowest risk 8% compounder that I'm aware of or amongst the lowest risk. So I would be very inclined, especially for people that are not in their retirement and don't need the income on a monthly basis or a quarterly basis that are trying to grow your capital over time, I would be very, very inclined to allocate most, if not all, that money towards Berkshire. And maybe I'd be a little patient and say maybe the market, I'm not as comfortable today, and I believe it's worth 525, and that 525 is going to go up. And that the market, you know, if I watch long enough, I might get closer to 525, or I might get 550. So I might be a little patient in buying, but I would, my answer would be I'd be very confident in buying Berkshire with that $100 compared to the other two options.

Okay. Thank you. Thanks, Andrew. Yep. Any other questions on Berkshire?

55:48 What I would pitch next, and how I look for it

Okay, back to Luke. What is the, what are you pitching at next year's Genius of Buffett course? Well, I've been pretty unsuccessful the last couple of years. I would say in addition to Berkshire, and I'll continue to update this site quarterly and then add other research. I don't know what I'll pitch because it really depends on the price to value. I'm a very value sensitive investor. Even when I find a great company, just like Warren, I want to get it at a really attractive price. I don't want to just make the 10%. I want the 10% plus a discount to intrinsic value.

If you go on my Twitter or x.com under my name, I've done an idea of the year. And the ideas of the year, I've done AirCap, which I think is getting a bit expensive. I've done Garrett Motion, which is a turbocharger auto part and industrial company. I've done Sirius XM. And then this year I did Decker. Decker's, I think, continues to trade around 10 times cash. I pitched it last year at Genius of Buffett. Shoe companies are really out of favor. But Decker's has an incredible product and an incredible financial model. And they're buying back a lot of stock. So at today's price, I'd be very inclined to continue to pitch Decker, which I wrote up and I write up every quarter on Twitter. I still like Sirius XM. Berkshire Hathaway owns 35% of Sirius XM. So you've already got exposure. And then the other company, which was Garrett Motion, which I wrote up, I think, in 2024.

I'm very keen on the outlook of that company. The auto parts sector is not one that anyone's really too interested in because we all think we're going to go battery electric cars and we're not going to need the gasoline engines. But that company has really reinvented itself as an industrial company that makes turbochargers or devices that make the backup generators and power generation for data centers more efficient. And they're also developed some new products that are used in HVAC and cooling. So cooling data centers, cooling batteries, cooling fast charging cars, they built a compressor that I think is some very interesting, simple, but interesting and valuable technology. So if I if I was at the course right now, I would probably be pitching both Decker and Garrett Motion. And there's a lot of detail on Twitter, which I know not everyone has access to. And maybe my next step will be to write a report on those two companies and add that to the intrinsic value per share website.

Can I ask you a question and ask what you would pitch? I guess I would pitch Nike again. So also another shoe company. I agree with you. I agree with you out of favor on the shoe companies. And as you know, I'm actually I use On for running and I just bought my 25th pair despite also being a Deckers shareholder. And I keep thinking maybe on we'll make it eventually. So maybe back to your group, like these new groups that Greg is assembling. He should have like the whole footlocker.

Yeah, it's very interesting. I did pitch that shoe company, Deckers, which owns HOKA and UGG. And the way I pitched it, I remember saying Warren Buffett likes investing in shoes and in two minutes, so will you. And inside of Berkshire, they own the Brooks running shoe brand. They own a cowboy boot company called Justin boot and Warren always says one of his biggest mistakes was buying a shoe company in 1993, which was a New England Dexter shoes, which I learned later made bowling shoes. So that wasn't the best bet he's ever made.

But shoe companies, people tend to be pretty loyal to their brand. And I remember the CEO of Brooks running at the time, Jim Weber, he presented in in Omaha and he basically compared running shoes to razor and razor blades. And he at that time said, once I convince a customer that they should be running in Brooks and they're out running in their shoes, they're going to buy from me 2.4 pairs a year. And at $150 a pair, that's $500 of annual revenue. And so everyone is always worried about the shoe's not going to be fashionable. The kids aren't going to buy it anymore. But when you see a brand like On, Nike, HOKA, the customer like you, you're on your 25th pair of On. So that that's really a great annuity business. And that's really probably worth a lot higher multiple than 10.

When the market trades at 25 times earnings and we don't know what's going to happen to software because of AI. And then we have companies with very loyal customers that are trading at 10 times earning and buying back their own stock. I agree with you that probably that whole sector is pretty attractive. And that'll just lead me to a thought that I was talking about Greg creating sectors within Berkshire. But one of the things that I've seen Warren do quite frequently is he doesn't just pick a great stock. Usually what he does is he identifies a change in an industry and then often buys either the best company in that industry or buys all of the companies that are doing well in that industry.

An example I can give is banking sector. And I think around 2017, 18, he was buying all of the major banks. So he was he had Bank of America, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan. He bought Boney. He several other regional banks, Bank of New York Mellon. And then shortly thereafter, he bought all of the airlines. So he bought all four airlines. And if we rewind back to, I think, around 2005 or 2006, he identified that the railroad industry in the United States was very well consolidated and becoming increasingly profitable. And before he bought the BNSF, he actually bought, I believe, around 10 percent of all of the railroads in North America, not in Canada. And then when he identified the opportunity to own all of BNSF, he sold the other railroads and took full ownership of one. So I think kind of making a lesson out of it is you tend to not just find one great company in a sector. It tends to be a great sector. And things go through cycles, like I was talking about housings in a poor cycle. But I wouldn't be surprised if some of these sectors that have been really out of favor, whether that's shoes and fashion, whether that's things related to housing, that you're able to buy them at very attractive prices without a lot of growth expected. And when you have low expectations in the stock market and you pay a really low price, if you wait long enough, good things usually happen. So, yeah, to draw a lesson out of your suggestion, but I'll have to take another look myself at Nike, too.

Thanks, Luke. I think we're just over an hour. I think a majority of the people have lasted the whole time. So hopefully it was achieving our goals of having fun, learning something and being inspired. What I'd like to do is ask anybody who signed up on the website or received an email from me, I would love to hear your feedback on the session, any thoughts you have, any open questions, any other companies, let's say, that Berkshire owns that you'd like to see a deep dive. Or if there's other stocks maybe you own or you're interested or you think many people would be interested in so that we can continue the sessions.

1:03:58 Closing

I really enjoyed this. I would like to do it again. My intention is to continue to update the intrinsic value every quarter for Berkshire. And I think Ahmed, who I see, thank you, Ahmed, he suggested the next one should be on Google. So that's a possibility. But if you guys can give me your feedback on how we can do this better, what else we can say or add or other companies or things you'd like to see added to the website or discussed on the next webinar, I'd love to hear that from you. So that would be greatly appreciated.

And that's all I got. So thank you for spending part of your Friday evening, afternoon, middle of the night or whatever time frame it is together. I really appreciate you guys coming and supporting this. So enjoy talking with you guys all. Thank you, guys. Take care, Andrew. Thank you. Thanks for the invite. Welcome. Thanks for coming. Thanks for the questions, Srivam. Thank you, Andrew. Welcome. See you later.

Research and education only. Not investment advice and not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. The author may hold positions in the companies discussed.